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Abstract

Our research addresses fundamental long-standing concerns in the compensating
wage differentials literature and its public policy implications: the econometric properties
of estimates of the value of statistical life (VSL) and the wide range of such estimates
from about $0 to almost $30 million. Here we address most of the prominent econometric
issues by applying panel data, a new and more accurate fatality risk measure, and
systematic application of panel data estimators. Controlling for measurement error,
endogeneity, latent individual heterogeneity that may be correlated with the regressors,
state dependence, and sample composition yields an estimated value of a statistical life of
about $7 million–$12 million, which we show can clarify greatly the cost-effectiveness of
regulatory decisions. We show that probably the most important econometric issue is
controlling for latent heterogeneity; less important is how one does it.
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1. Introduction
The value of statistical life (VSL) concept based on econometric estimates of
wage-fatality risk tradeoffs in the labor market is well established in the economics
literature. The method provides the yardstick that the U.S. Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) requires agencies to use in valuing fatality risks reduced by regulatory
programs. 1 More recently, VSL estimates have also provided the basis for assessing a
broad range of issues from the mortality costs of the Iraq war (Wallsten and Kosec 2005,
Bilmes and Stiglitz 2006) to a refined measurement of economic growth (Jena, Mulligan,
Philipson, and Sun 2008). Notwithstanding the wide use of the VSL approach, there is
still concern over excessively large/small estimates and the wide range of VSL estimates.
One approach to dealing with the dispersion of VSL estimates, which has been used by
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, has been to rely on meta analyses of the labor
market VSL literature. Our research demonstrates how using the best available data and
econometric practices affects the estimated VSL so as to narrow the range of estimates.
We begin with an econometric framework that is a slight extension of the usual
hedonic wage equation used in the value of statistical life literature. For worker i (i =
1,…,N) in industry j (j = 1,…,J) and occupation k (k = 1,…,K) at time t (t = 1,…,T) the
hedonic tradeoff between the wage and risk of fatality is described by

ln wijkt = α 0+i + α 0−i + α1π jkt + X ijkt β + uijkt ,

(1)

where ln wijkt is the natural log of the hourly wage rate; πjkt is the industry and occupation
specific fatality rate; Xijkt is a vector containing dummy variables for the worker’s onedigit occupation (and industry in some specifications), state and region of residence, plus
1

See U.S. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis (Sept. 17, 2003) which is
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf.

the usual demographic variables: worker education, age and age squared, race, marital
status, and union status; uijkt is an error term allowing conditional heteroskedasticity and
within industry by occupation autocorrelation. 2 Equation (1) is slightly unfamiliar as it
contains two latent individual effects: one that is positively correlated with wages and the
fatality rate (α 0+i ) and one that is positively correlated with wages and negatively
correlated with the fatality rate (α 0−i ) . The first individual effect reflects unmeasured job
productivity that leads more productive/higher wage workers to take safer jobs and the
second individual effect reflects unmeasured individual differences in personal safety
productivity that leads higher wage workers to take what appears to be more dangerous
jobs because the true danger level for such a worker is lower than the measured fatality
rate. Our research uses equation (1) in conjunction with a variety of econometric
techniques, which demonstrates the capabilities of individual panel data that incorporate
fatality risk measures that vary by year.
To set the stage, an extremely wide range of labor market VSL estimates from
micro cross-section data has generated a series of prominent econometric controversies
reviewed by Viscusi and Aldy (2003). Hedonic equilibrium in the labor market means
that equation (1) traces out the locus of labor market equilibria involving the offer curves
of firms and the supply curves of workers. A salient concern in estimating and
interpreting equation (1) involves the fatality risk variable, which ideally should serve as
a measure of the risk beliefs of workers and firms for the particular job. Broadly defined
risk measures, such as those pertinent to one’s industry or general occupation, may
2

We adopt a parametric specification of the regression model representing hedonic equilibrium in (1) for
comparison purposes with the existing literature. An important emerging line of research is how more
econometrically free-form representations of hedonic labor markets facilitates identification of underlying
fundamentals, which would further generalize estimates of VSL (Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim 2004).

involve substantial measurement error. Other concerns are over the potential endogeneity
of the job risk measure (Ashenfelter and Greenstone 2004a) and possible state
dependence in wages (MaCurdy 2007). Here we will exploit the capabilities of a very
refined risk measure defined over time and by occupation and industry, coupled with
panel data on workers’ labor market decisions, to resolve many prominent issues in the
hedonic labor market literature. Because our focus is on the average VSL across a broad
sample of workers, we will consequently not explore emerging interest in the
heterogeneity of VSL by age and other personal characteristics (Kniesner, Viscusi, and
Ziliak 2006; Aldy and Viscusi 2008).
We devote particular attention to measurement errors, which have been noted in
Black and Kniesner (2003), Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004b), and Ashenfelter (2006).
Although we do not have information on subjective risk beliefs, we use very detailed data
on objective risk measures and consider the possibility that workers are driven by risk
expectations. Published industry risk beliefs are strongly correlated with subjective risk
values, 3 and we follow the standard practice of matching to workers in the sample an
objective risk measure. Where we differ from most previous studies is the pertinence of
the risk data to the worker’s particular job, and ours is the first study to account for the
variation of the more pertinent risk level within the context of a panel data study.
We address the pivotal issue of measurement error in several ways. The fatality
risk variable is not by industry or occupation alone, as is the norm in almost all previous
studies, but is a refined measure based on 720 industry-occupation cells. We use not only
one-year but also three-year averages to reduce the influence of random year-to-year

3

See Viscusi and Aldy (2003) for a review.

fluctuations. 4 Because the fatality rate data are available by year, workers in our panel
who do not change jobs can also have a different fatality risk in different years. In
contrast, the only previous panel-based labor market VSL study used the same
occupational risk measure based on the 1967 Society of Actuaries data for 37 narrowly
defined high risk occupations for all years, so that all possible variation in risk was
restricted to workers who changed occupations (Brown 1980). Our research also explores
using adjacent observation differences as well as longer differences, for which the
influence of measurement error should be less pronounced (Griliches and Hausman
1986). In addition, we examine how instrumental variable estimates for each approach
attenuates measurement error and endogeneity bias. Finally, our rational expectations and
dynamic first-difference models’ estimates make it possible to include longer-run worker
adaptations to changes in their job risk level that may occur if they are not perfectly
informed about the risk initially.
As mentioned earlier, potential biases in VSL estimates can arise from unmodeled
worker productivity and safety-related productivity as reflected in (α 0+i ) and (α 0−i ) in
equation (1) (Hwang, Reed, and Hubbard 1992; Viscusi and Hersch 2001; Shogren and
Stamland 2002). Panel data allow the researcher to sweep out all such time invariant
individual effects and to infer their relative importance in terms of biasing VSL if ignored
econometrically. In each instance, we use the pertinent instrumental variables estimator.
Our work also distinguishes job movers from job stayers. We find that most of the
variation in risk and most of the evidence of positive VSLs stems from people changing

4

The only previous use of the fatality rate data at our level of disaggregation and for different periods of
time is in Viscusi (2004). Kniesner, Viscusi, and Ziliak (2006) also used the 720 cell measure but not the
multi-year averages. Neither study employed panel-data econometric techniques.

jobs across occupations or industries possibly endogenously rather than from variation in
risk levels over time in a given job setting.
Our econometric refinements using panel data have a substantial effect on the
estimated VSL levels. They reduce the estimated VSL by more than 50 percent from the
implausibly large cross-section PSID-based VSLs of $20–30 million. We demonstrate
how systematic econometric modeling narrows the estimated value of a statistical life
from about $0–$30 million to about $7 million–$12 million, which we then show clarifies
the choice of the proper labor market based VSL for policy evaluations.
2. Panel Data Econometric Framework
Standard panel-data estimators permitting latent worker-specific heterogeneity
through person-specific intercepts in equation (1) are the deviation from time-mean
(within) estimator and the time-difference (first- and long-differences) estimators. The
fixed effects include all person-specific time-invariant differences in tastes and all aspects
of productivity, which may be correlated with the regressors in X. The two estimators
yield identical results when there are two time periods and when the number of periods
converges towards infinity. With a finite number of periods (T > 2), estimates from the
two different fixed-effects estimators can diverge due to possible non-stationarity in
wages, measurement error, or model misspecification (Wooldridge 2002). Because wages
from longitudinal data on individuals have been shown to be non-stationary in other
contexts (Abowd and Card 1989; MaCurdy 2007), we adopt the first-difference model as
a baseline.
The first-difference model eliminates time-invariant effects by estimating the
changes over time in hedonic equilibrium

∆ ln wijkt= α1∆π jkt + ∆X ijkt β + ∆uijkt ,

(2)

where ∆ refers to the first-difference operator (Weiss and Lillard 1978).
The first-difference model could exacerbate errors-in-variables problems relative
to the within model (Griliches and Hausman 1986). If the fatality rate is measured with a
classical error, then the first-difference estimate of α̂1 may be attenuated relative to the
within estimate. An advantage of the regression specification in equation (2), which
considers intertemporal changes in hedonic equilibrium outcomes, arises because we can
use so-called wider (2+ year) differences. If ∆ ≥ 2 then measurement error effects are
mitigated in equation (2) relative to within-differences regression (Griliches and
Hausman 1986; Hahn, Hausman, and Kuersteiner 2007). As discussed in the data section
below, we additionally address the measurement error issue in the fatality rate by
employing multi-year averages of fatalities. For completeness we also note how the firstdifference and longer-differences estimates compare to the within estimates.
Lillard and Weiss (1979) demonstrated that earnings functions may not only have
idiosyncratic differences in levels but also have idiosyncratic differences in growth. To
correct for wages that may not be difference stationary as implied by equation (2) we
estimate a double differenced version of equation (2) that is

∆ 2 ln wijkt= α1∆ 2π jkt + ∆ 2 X ijkt β + ∆ 2uijkt ,

(3)

where ∆ 2 = ∆ t − ∆ t −1 , commonly known as the difference-in-difference operator.
Finally, we also estimate a dynamic version of equation (2) by adding γ∆ ln wijkt−1
to the right-hand side and using two first-difference instrumental variables estimators: (i)
using the two-period lagged level of the dependent variable as an identifying instrument
for the one-period lagged difference in the dependent variable (Greene 2008, Chapter 15)

and (ii) using an instrument set that grows as the time-series dimension of the panel
evolves (Arellano and Bond 1991). The lagged dependent variable controls for additional
heterogeneity and serial correlation plus sluggish adjustment to equilibrium (state
dependence). We therefore compare the estimated short-run effect, α̂1 , to the estimated
long-run effect, αˆ1 /(1 − γˆ ) , and their associated VSLs.
2.1 Comparison Estimators
If E[uijk | π jk , X ijk ] = 0 and E[α 0+i,− | π jk , X ijk ] = 0 , which are the zero conditional
mean assumptions of least squares regression, then OLS estimation of the hedonic
equilibrium in equation (1) using pooled cross-section time-series data is consistent. If
the zero conditional mean assumption holds, which is unlikely to be the case, then the
two basic estimators frequently employed with panel data, the between-groups estimator
and the random-effects estimator, will yield consistent coefficient estimates.
The between-groups estimator is a cross-sectional estimator using individuals’
time-means of the variables
ln w=
α 1π jk + X ijk β + δ + uijk ,
ijk
with ln wijk =

(4)

1 T
∑ ln wijkt and other variables similarly defined. A potential advantage of
T t =1

the between-groups estimator is that measurement-error induced attenuation bias in
estimated coefficients may be reduced because averaging smoothes the data generating
process. Because measurement error affects estimates of the VSL (Black and Kniesner
2003; Ashenfelter 2006), the between-groups estimator should provide improved
estimates of the wage-fatal risk tradeoff over pooled time-series cross-section OLS
estimates of equation (1).

The random-effects model differs from the OLS model in equation (1) by explicit
inclusion of the latent heterogeneity terms, α 0+i , α 0−i , in the model’s error structure, but is
similar to OLS in that this additional source of error is also treated as exogenous to the
fatality risk and other demographic variables. The implication is that selection into
possibly risky occupations and industries on the basis of unobserved productivity and
tastes is purely random across the population of workers. Although both the pooled least
squares and between-groups estimators remain consistent in the presence of random
heterogeneity, the random-effects estimator will be more efficient because it accounts for
person-specific autocorrelation in the wage process. The random-effects estimator is thus
a weighted average of the between-groups variation and the within-groups variation.
Finally, suppose that selection into a particular industry and occupation is not
random with respect to time-invariant unobserved productivity and risk preferences. In
the non-random selection case, estimates of VSL based on the pooled cross-section,
between-groups, or random-effects estimators will be biased and inconsistent; the firstdifferences and double-differences estimators in equations (2) and (3), as well as the
dynamic first-difference estimator, can be consistent despite non-random job switching.
2.2 Research Objective
The focal parameter of interest in each of the regression models we estimate is

αˆ1 , which is used in constructing estimates of the value of a statistical life. Accounting
for the fact that fatality risk is per 100,000 workers and that the typical work-year is
about 2000 hours, the estimated value of a statistical life at the mean level of wages is
 ∂wˆ ˆ

= α1 × w) × 2000 × 100, 000  .
VSL = (
 ∂π


(5)

Although the VSL function in equation (5) can be evaluated at various points in the wage
distribution, most studies report only the mean effect. To highlight the differences in
estimates of the VSL with and without controls for unobserved individual differences, we
follow the standard convention of focusing on VSL in our estimates presented below.
Our primary objective is to examine how following systematic econometric practices for
panel data models reduces the estimated range of VSL. However, we also present
estimates of the mean VSL using the sample average of hours worked, , in lieu of 2,000
hours. In addition, we provide 95 percent confidence intervals around the mean VSL.
3. Data and Sample Descriptions
The main body of our data come from the 1993–2001 waves of the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID), which provides individual-level data on wages, industry and
occupation, and demographics. The PSID survey has followed a core set of households
since 1968 plus newly formed households as members of the original core have split off
into new families.
3.1 PSID Sample
The sample we use consists of male heads of household ages 18–65 who are in
the random Survey Research Center (SRC) portion of the PSID, and thus excludes the
oversample of the poor in the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) and the Latino
sub-sample. The male heads in our regressions (i) worked for hourly or salary pay at
some point in the previous calendar year, (ii) are not permanently disabled or
institutionalized, (iii) are not in agriculture or the armed forces, (iv) have a real hourly

wage greater than $2 per hour and less than $100 per hour, and (v) have no missing data
on wages, education, region, industry, and occupation.
Beginning in 1997 the PSID moved to every other year interviewing. For
consistent spacing of survey response we use data from the 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, and
2001 waves. The use of every other year responses will be one of many mechanisms to
reduce the influence of measurement error in our estimated VSL. We do not require
individuals to be present for the entire sample period; we have an unbalanced panel
where we take missing values as random events. 5 Our sample filters yield 2,036 men and
6,625 person-years. About 40 percent of the men are present for all five waves (nine
years); another 25 percent are present for at least four waves.
The focal variable from the PSID in our models of hedonic labor market
equilibrium is the hourly wage rate. For workers paid by the hour the survey records the
gross hourly wage rate. The interviewer asks salaried workers how frequently they are
paid, such as weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly. The interviewer then norms a salaried
worker's pay by a fixed number of hours worked depending on the pay period. For
example, salary divided by 40 is the hourly wage rate constructed for a salaried worker
paid weekly. We deflate the nominal wage by the personal consumption expenditure
deflator for 2001 base year. We then take the natural log of the real wage rate to
minimize the influence of outliers and for ease of comparison with others’ estimates.
The demographic controls in the model include years of formal education, a
quadratic in age, dummy variables for state of residence, dummy indicators for region of
country (northeast, north central, and west with south the omitted region), race (white =

5

Ziliak and Kniesner (1998) show that when there is nonrandom attrition our differenced data models
should remove it along with the other time-invariant factors.

1), union status (coverage = 1), marital status (married = 1), and one-digit occupation.
Table 1 presents summary statistics.
3.2 Fatality Risk Measures
We use the fatality rate for the worker’s two-digit industry by one-digit
occupation group. We distinguished 720 industry-occupation groups using a breakdown
of 72 two-digit SIC code industries and the 10 one-digit occupational groups. After
constructing codes for two-digit industry by one-digit occupation in the PSID we then
matched each worker to the relevant industry-occupation fatality risk. We constructed a
worker fatality risk variable using proprietary U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data from
the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) for 1992–2002. 6
The CFOI provides the most comprehensive inventory to date of all work-related
fatalities in a given year. The CFOI data come from reports by the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, workers’ compensation reports, death certificates, and
medical examiner reports. To be classified as a work-related injury the decedent must
have been employed at the time of the fatal event and engaged in legal work activity that
required the worker be present at the site of the fatal incident. In each case the BLS
verifies the work status of the decedent with two or more of the above source documents
or with a follow-up questionnaire in conjunction with a source document.
The underlying assumption in our research and almost the entire hedonic
literature more generally is that the subjective risk assessments by workers and firms can
6

The fatality data can be obtained on CD-ROM via a confidential agreement with the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Our variable construction procedure follows that in Viscusi (2004), which describes the
properties of the 720 industry-occupation breakdown in greater detail. In our basic estimation sample we
limit observations to those where the annual change in fatality risk is no less than −75 percent and no more
than +300 per cent. In our subsequent robustness checks in Table 8 we examine what happens to VSL if we
apply the same screen to the three-year change or eliminate the screen completely.

be captured by objective measures of the risk. Workers and firms use available
information about the nature of the job and possibly the accident record itself in forming
risk beliefs. The models do not assume that workers and firms are aware of the published
risk measures at any point in time. Rather, the objective measures serve as a proxy for the
subjective beliefs. Previous research reviewed in Viscusi and Aldy (2003) has indicated a
strong correlation between workers’ subjective risk beliefs and published injury rates.
Because our fatality risk variable is by industry and by occupation, it will provide a much
more pertinent measure of the risk associated with a particular job than a more broadly
based index, such as the industry risk alone, which is the most widely used job risk
variable. For example, miners and secretaries in the coal mining industry face quite
different risks, so that taking into account the occupation as well as the industry as we do
here substantially reduces the measurement error in the fatality risk variable.
The importance of the industry-occupation structure of our risk variable is
especially great within the context of a panel data analysis. The previous panel study by
Brown (1980) used a time-invariant fatality risk measure for 37 relatively high risk
occupations. By using a fatality risk variable that varies over time and is defined for 720
industry-occupation groups, we greatly expand the observed variance in workers’ job
risks across different periods.
We construct two measures of fatal risk, which differ according to the numerator.
The first measure simply uses the number of fatalities in each industry-occupation cell.
The second measure uses a three-year average of fatalities surrounding each PSID survey
year (1992–1994 for the 1993 wave, 1994–1996 for the 1995 wave, and so on). The
denominator for each measure used to construct the fatality risk is the number of

employees for that industry-occupation group in survey year t. Both of our two measures
of the fatality risk are time-varying because of changes in both the numerator and the
denominator. 7
We expect there to be less measurement error in the 3-year average fatality rates
relative to the annual rate because the averaging process will reduce the influence of
random fluctuations in fatalities as well as mitigate the small sample problems that arise
from many narrowly defined job categories. We also expect less reporting error in the
industry information than in the occupation information, so even our annual measure
should have less measurement error than if the worker’s occupation were the basis for
matching (Mellow and Sider 1983, Black and Kniesner 2003). But to further reduce the
influence of large swings in fatality risk, we drop person-years where the percentage
change in fatality risk exceeds a positive 300 percent or negative 75 percent. Table 1 lists
the means and standard deviations for both fatality risk measures. The sample mean
fatality risk for the annual measure is 6.4/100,000. As expected, the variation in the
annual measure exceeds that of the 3-year average.
Our research also avoids a problem plaguing past attempts to estimate the wagefatal risk tradeoff with panel data. If the fatality rate is an aggregate by industry or
occupation the within or first-difference transformation leaves little variation in the
fatality risk measure to identify credibly the fatality parameter. Most of the variation in
aggregate fatality risk is of the so-called between-groups variety (across occupations or
industries at a point in time) and not of the within-groups variety (within either
occupations or industries over time). Although between-group variation exceeds within7

We used the bi-annual employment averages from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population
Survey, unpublished table, Table 6, Employed Persons by Detailed Industry and Occupation for 1993–
2001.

group variation (Table 2), the within variation in our more disaggregate measures is
sufficiently large (about 33–40 percent of the between variation) so that it may be
feasible to identify the fatal risk parameter and VSL in our panel data models. Finally, we
also address the issue that between-group variation in fatality risk may be generated by
endogenous job switching.
4. Wage Equation Estimates
Although we suppress the coefficients for ease of presentation, each regression
model we use controls for a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region,
marital status, union status, race, and one-digit occupation. Because of the substantial
heterogeneity of jobs in different occupations, the regressions include a set of one-digit
occupation dummies. In addition, because there might be unmeasured differences in labor
markets across states that do not vary with time, we include a full set of state fixed
effects. Likewise, workers in a given year may face common macroeconomic shocks to
wages, and so we include a vector of year dummies in all models. However, our baseline
estimating equations do not include industry dummy variables as well because doing so
could introduce substantial multicollinearity with respect to the fatality risk variable,
which involves matching workers to fatality risk based on their industry and occupation.
(In our subsequent robustness checks we add industry dummies.) Reported standard
errors are clustered by industry and occupation and are also robust to the relevant
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Note that our first-difference regressions
automatically net out the influence of industry and other job characteristics that do not
change over time, and the double-difference regressions net out additional trending
factors.

Because our primary focus is on the panel estimates, we do not include regressors
that exhibit little variation across the time periods. Within the panel data context workers’
compensation benefit levels are fixed in real terms for most workers. The main benefit
measures that have been used in the hedonic literature pertain to the weekly benefit level
for temporary partial disability. The associated wage replacement rate changed for only
five states during the nine years of our data, and the changes were minor. There is also
not much variation across states in replacement rates. For half the states the replacement
rate is at two-thirds of the worker’s wage, and many other states have similar timeinvariant replacement rates such as 70 percent. States exhibit greater variation with
respect to the maximum weekly benefits that will be paid for temporary partial disability.
However, the benefit maximums tend to increase steadily over time, reflecting
adjustments for price inflation. Indeed, during 1992–2001, 34 states had benefit growth
rates that were confined to a 1.7 percent growth rate band surrounding the rate of price
inflation. Thus, with the panel data context workers’ compensation benefit levels will
tend to be fixed for most workers in the sample, and we do not include a workers’
compensation variable. However, to the extent that there is cross-state variation in benefit
levels these differences will be absorbed in our controls for state fixed effects.
4.1 Focal Estimates from Panel Data
The baseline first-difference estimates from equation (2) appear in Table 3. The
results begin our attempt to address systematically not only latent heterogeneity and
possibly trended regressors, but also measurement error. Comparing estimates both down
a column and across a row reveals the effect of measurement error. The results are
reasonable from both an econometric and economic perspective and provide the

comparison point for our core research issue, which is how badly VSL can be misrepresented if certain basic econometric issues are mis-handled.
The VSL implied by the baseline model’s coefficient for the annual fatality rate in
Table 3 using the sample mean wage of $21 in (5) is $6.9 million, with a confidence
interval of $6.8 million–$7.1 million.8 We emphasize that a novel aspect of our research
is that it helps clarify the size of possible measurement error effects. If measurement error
in fatality risk is random it will attenuate coefficient estimates and should be reduced by
letting the fatality rate encompass a wider time interval. Compared to VSL from the more
typical annual risk measure, the estimated VSL in Table 3 is about 13 percent larger when
fatality risk is a three-year average. The last two columns of Table 3 report the results for
widest possible differences ( ln w2001 − ln w1993 ) as well as difference-in-differences from
equation (3), which should remove possible spurious estimated effects from variables that
are not difference stationary. The main message from Table 3 is that correcting for
measurement error in most cases enlarges estimated VSL, and that even for the relatively
basic panel models using differencing, the range for VSL is not uncomfortably large:
about $7 million–$9 million when using a 2000 hour work year (CI = $6.8 million–$9.7
million) and about $8 million–$10 million when using sample average hours to compute
VSL (CI = $7.5 million–$10.9 million).
An issue seldom addressed in panel wage equations producing VSL is endogeneity
of the fatality change regressor, which may result from dynamic decisions workers make
to change jobs (Solon 1986, 1989; Spengler and Schaffner 2006). Some changes in
fatality risk will occur because of within industry-occupation cell changes and others will
8

The confidence interval uses a first-order Taylor series expansion to estimate the variance of the mean

(

)

VSL, which
from equation (5) is Var (VSL ) 2000 *100, 000 * w * Var (αˆ1 ) + αˆ1 Var ( w) .
=
2

2

2

2

occur because workers switch industry-occupation cells. Within the context of potentially
hazardous employment, much of the mobility stems from workers learning about the
risks on the job and then quitting if the compensating differential is insufficient given that
information (Viscusi 1979). Within the context of multi-period Bayesian decisions, a
desire to switch does not require that workers initially underestimated the risk, as
imprecise risk beliefs can also generate a greater willingness to incur job risks than is
warranted by the mean risk level. Interestingly, for the job changers in our sample, 51
percent switch to lower fatality risk jobs and 46 percent switch to higher fatality risk jobs
so that on balance there is some effort to sort into safer employment.
We examine the practical importance of job changing status for panel-based
estimation in Table 4, where we stratify the data by whether ∆πt is due to within or
between cell changes, including immediately before and after a worker changes cells. The
main econometric contribution to compensating differentials for fatality risk comes from
workers who generate differences in risk over time by switching industry-occupation
cells. The difference in estimated VSL in Table 4 comes from the fact that σ π2t is at least 8
times larger for switchers (see Table 2). There is too little within-cells variation to reveal
much of a compensating differential for job stayers. More important, because so much of
the variation producing the wage differential in Table 3 comes from job changers, and the
variation for switchers may be related to wages, it is imperative to treat ∆π as
endogenous.
The estimated range for VSL narrows even further when we allow for endogeneity
and instrument the change in fatality risk. The instrumental variables regressions in Table
5 control for both classical measurement errors and endogeneity. Specifically, based on

the results of Griliches and Hausman (1986) we interchangeably use the (t−1) and (t−3)
levels of the fatality risk, or the (t−1) less (t−3) difference. We limit the focus to the
annual fatality rate so as to have enough lagged fatality and fatality differences as
instruments. 9 The main result is a fairly narrow range for the estimated VSL,
approximately $7 million–$8 million when we instrument the annual change in fatality
risk (CI = $6.6–$8 million).
Table 6 presents our final focal panel results from dynamic first-difference
regressions. The short-run effects from the dynamic model appear in column 1 and the
long-run (steady state) estimates appear in column 2. Note that our first-differences
estimator focuses on changes in wages in response to changes in risk. The mechanism by
which the changes will become reflected in the labor market hinges on how shifts in the
risk level will affect the tangencies of the constant expected utility loci with the market
offer curve. To the extent that the updating of risk beliefs occurs gradually over time,
which is not unreasonable because even release of the government risk data is not
contemporaneous, one would expect the long-run effects on wages of changes in job risk
to exceed the short-run effects. Limitations on mobility will reinforce a lagged influence
(state dependence).
As one would then expect, the steady state estimates of VSL after the estimated
three-year adjustment period in the results in Table 6 are larger than the short-run
estimates. The difference between the short-run and long-run VSL is about $2 million,
ranging from $7 million–$8 million versus $9 million–$10 million using a standard work

9

Greene (2008, Chapter 15) notes that the large sample variance of the dynamic difference estimator is
smaller when lagged levels rather than lagged differences are part of the instruments, which here include all
exogenous explanatory variables. The first-stage results here and in subsequent tables pass the standard
weak instruments check based on a partial R2 of at least 0.10.

year and about $8 million–$9 million versus about $10 million–$11 million using sample
average annual hours worked. Again, the range of VSL estimates is not great when panel
data are used with estimators that accommodate endogeneity, weak instruments,
measurement error, latent heterogeneity and possible state dependence.
4.2 Comparison Results From Cross-Section Estimators
Table 7 presents the comparison models that flesh out the most salient
econometric issues when compared to the focal panel results from Tables 3–6 just
presented.
One problematic result in the literature is the regularly occurring large value for
VSL when the PSID is used as a cross-section (Viscusi and Aldy 2003). Notice that the
cross-section estimators in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 produce large implied VSLs, about
$16 million–$28 million.
In contrast, column 3 of Table 7 reports estimates from the panel random-effects
estimator, where a Breusch-Pagan test supports heterogeneous intercepts. Recall that the
random-effects estimator accounts for unobserved heterogeneity, which is assumed to be
uncorrelated with observed covariates. It is fairly common in labor-market research to
reject the assumption of no correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and observed
covariates; and Hausman test results indicate a similar rejection here. The simple fixed
effects within estimator in the last column is preferred over the simple random effects
estimator, with an estimated VSL of about $6–$8 million. Allowing for the possibility of
unobserved productivity and preferences for risk, even if it is improperly assumed to be
randomly distributed in the population, reduces the estimated VSL by up to 60 percent
relative to a model that ignores latent heterogeneity.

The difference in estimated VSL with versus without latent individual
heterogeneity in the model is consistent with the theoretical emphasis in Shogren and
Stamland (2002) that failure to control for unobserved skill results in a potentially
substantial upward bias in the estimated VSL. Taking into account the influence of
individual heterogeneity implies that, on balance, unobservable person-specific
differences in safety-related productivity and risk preferences are a more powerful
influence than unobservable productivity generally, which Hwang, Reed, and Hubbard
(1992) hypothesize to have the opposite effect.
4.3 Panel Data Estimator Specification Checks
As a final dimension of our research we present Tables 8–10, which contain
results from an extensive set of specification checks designed to examine whether the
level and range of VSL from panel data discussed thus far are sensitive to the many
options the researcher has in estimating a linear panel model. In particular, we further
explore the importance of econometric modeling choices for covariates, endogeneity,
dynamics, expectations, and sample composition in panel data based estimates of VSL.
The results of Table 8 show little effect on VSL from whether or not one trims the
set of observations by the size of change in fatality rates between observation years or
adds an additional control for industry. What matters more to the size of VSL is how the
researcher addresses injury risk expectations and wage dynamics, which we now discuss.
It is possible that workers base their willingness to work in a given setting on an
expected rather than actual observed fatality risk. A simple econometric implementation
of the expectations possibility would be to use the lagged fatality measure rather than a
concurrent fatality measure as the focal regressor, which is the set of results in the first

column of Table 8. Direct substitution of a lagged regressor is also a simple IV estimator
for an endogenous fatality regressor. The simple substitution of lagged fatality lowers the
estimated VSL to $4 million–$6 million (CI = $3.4 million–$5.9 million). To be fair, one
should also check more sophisticated representations of expectations such as rational
expectations, that are IV estimates using multiple fatality lags, which are the
specifications in Tables 5 and 9. When we estimate more sophisticated rational
expectations type models with multiple lagged values as instruments, as in Table 9, the
comparison results are similar to our earlier findings: the model passes the standard weak
instrument check and VSL is about $7 million–$9 million using a standard (2000 hour)
work year and about $8 million–$10 million using the higher sample average work year.
Our final comparison model is the most complex econometric approach, which is
the Arellano-Bond dynamic first differences model. In the previously discussed IV
models that include dynamics presented in Table 6 the instrument set for the lagged wage
regressor always contains two (further) lagged values. In the Arellano-Bond model
lagged values of wages are instruments but the instrument set grows as the sample
evolves temporally so that the last time period observation has the most instruments and
the earliest time period observation has the fewest instruments. 10 The Arellano-Bond
results in Table 10 produce VSLs that are about the same or a little higher than the
dynamic models that use much smaller temporally fixed instrument sets, as in Table 6.
5. Implications for Regulatory Cost-Effectiveness
Obtaining reliable estimates of compensating differential equations has long been
challenging because of the central roles of individual heterogeneity and state dependence
10

The Arellano-Bond model has also proved useful in studying job injury risk is the outcome of interest.
See Kniesner and Leeth (2004).

in affecting both the market offer curve and individual preferences. The often conflicting
influence of different unobservable factors has led to competing theories with predictions
of different direction.
The wide variation of VSL estimates in the literature also has generated concern
that underlying econometric problems may jeopardize the validity of those estimates. The
range for VSL in the existing literature is extremely wide, from about $0 million to $20
million. Previous studies using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics have often yielded
extremely high VSL estimates of $20+ million, which is also the case in our own crosssection based estimates with the PSID. Earlier research did not control for the host of
econometric problems we address here. A most important finding here is that controlling
for latent time-invariant heterogeneity is crucial – much more so than how one does it
econometrically.
Our first-difference estimation results use more refined fatality risk measures than
employed in earlier studies control for measurement errors and workplace safety
endogeneity in econometric specifications considering state dependence, expectations
and heterogeneity when examining the wage-fatality risk tradeoff. Comparison of the
various first-difference results with various cross-section estimates implies that
controlling for latent worker-specific heterogeneity reduces the estimated VSL by as
much as two-thirds and narrows greatly the VSL range to about $7 million–$12 million
depending on the time-frame (short-run versus long-run) and work year (standard or
sample average) in the calculation.
Narrowing VSL as we do here has substantial benefits for policy evaluation. In its
Budget Circular A4 (Sept. 17, 2003), the U.S. Office of Management and Budget requires

that agencies indicate the range of uncertainty around key parameter values used in
benefit-cost assessments. Attempting to bound the VSL based on a meta analysis
produces a wide range of estimates from nearly $0 to $20+ million. In addition to the
issue of what studies should be included in the meta analysis given the differences in data
sets, specifications, and study quality, we can also produce VSLs that mimic the literature
with ones as low as $0 if we limit the sample to workers who never change jobs and ones
as high as $28 million if we use the between estimator with the PSID as a cross-section
(CI = −$5.4 million–$28.1 million). As a consequence of the perceived indeterminacies
in VSL, agencies often have failed to provide any boundaries at all to the key VSL
parameter in their benefit assessments.
The advantage of using our VSL range in policy assessments can be illustrated by
an example of the cost-effectiveness of U.S. health and safety regulations. Using the
widely cited cost estimates from the U.S. Office of Management and Budget cited by
Breyer (1993), among others, and updating the values to $2001 to be consistent with our
VSL estimates, we illustrate the reduction of policy uncertainty achievable by application
of our estimates. Applying the meta analysis VSL range, 10 policies pass a benefit-cost
test, 20 fail a benefit-cost test, and 23 are in the indeterminate zone. Using our estimated
VSL range, the distributions becomes 27 policies that clearly pass a benefit-cost test, 23
that fail a benefit-cost test, with only 3 policies in the indeterminate range. Our narrowing
of the acceptable cost-per-life-saved range greatly reduces the range of indeterminacy
and is of substantial practical consequence given the actual distribution of regulatory
policy performance.

From a more conceptual standpoint, our research has resolved the econometric
issues giving rise to the very high/low levels and wide ranges of published VSL estimates.
The disparate results in previous studies may reflect the influence of omitted
unobservable effects, among other repairable econometric specification errors. Failure to
address the underlying econometric issues may have produced continuing controversy in
the economics literature over the hedonic method and unduly muddled the policy debate
over the use of VSL estimates in benefit calculations for government policies.

Table 1: Selected Summary Statistics
Mean
20.610
2.862
40.832
0.817
0.758
0.230
13.506
0.172
0.283
0.376
0.168

Standard
Deviation
13.041
0.566
8.452
0.386
0.428
0.421
2.221
0.378
0.451
0.484
0.374

One-Digit Industry Groups:
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation and Public Utilities
Wholesale and Retail Trade
Fire, Insurance, and Real Estate
Business and Repair Services
Personal Services
Entertainment and Professional Services
Public Administration

0.008
0.127
0.231
0.115
0.139
0.045
0.070
0.010
0.188
0.067

0.089
0.333
0.421
0.319
0.346
0.206
0.256
0.098
0.391
0.250

One-Digit Occupation Groups:
Executive and Managerial
Professional
Technicians
Sales
Administrative Support
Services
Precision Production Crafts
Machine Operators
Transportation
Handlers and Labors

0.191
0.158
0.042
0.031
0.050
0.082
0.231
0.079
0.090
0.046

0.393
0.365
0.202
0.174
0.219
0.274
0.421
0.270
0.286
0.209

Annual Fatality Rate (per 100,000)
3-Year Fatality Rate (per 100,000)

6.415
5.716

9.144
8.390

Real Hourly Wage
Log Real Hourly Wage
Age
Marital Status (1=Married)
Race (1=White)
Union (1=member)
Years of Schooling
Live in Northeast
Live in Northcentral
Live in South
Live in West

Number of Men = 2,036
Number of Person Years = 6,625

Table 2: Between and Within Group Variation for Industry by
Occupation Fatality Rates

Overall
Variance

Between
Group
Variance

Within
Group
Variance

69.866

50.447

19.419

52.077

39.401

12.676

Never Change Industry-Occupation
Annual Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)
3-Year Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)

71.646

68.356

3.290

52.458

51.629

0.828

Ever Change Industry-Occupation
Annual Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)
3-Year Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)

69.094

42.799

26.295

51.914

34.189

17.726

Only When Change Industry-Occupation
Annual Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)
3-Year Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)

70.591

46.240

24.351

64.927

43.908

21.019

Annual Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)
3-Year Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)

Table 3: First-Difference Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff

Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
95% CI
VSL - using average hours
95% CI
Number of Person-Years
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
95% CI
VSL - using average hours
95% CI

Static First
Difference
Estimates

First-Difference
Estimator for
2001minus1993

Difference in
Differences
Estimator

1.6007
(0.4793)

1.9438
(1.7223)

1.4851
(0.5196)

6.9
[6.8, 7.1]
7.9
[7.7, 8.1]

9.1
[8.5, 9.7]
10.2
[9.5, 10.9]

6.7
[6.5, 6.9]
7.7
[7.5, 7.9]

4338

1017

2788

1.7785
(0.5435)

1.8627
(1.5412)

1.8567
(0.6339)

7.8
[7.7, 8.0]
9.0
[8.8, 9.1]

8.8
[8.3, 9.3]
9.9
[9.3, 10.5]

8.5
[8.3, 8.7]
9.8
[9.5, 10.0]

Number of Person-Years
4916
1171
2992
Notes: Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for a
quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race, onedigit occupation, state, and year effects. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in
st
the table are divided by 1,000. 95% Confidence Intervals are constructed based on a 1 order
Taylor series expansion.

Table 4: Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff by Job Change Status
Static FirstDifference
Never Change Industry-Occupation
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
VSL - using average hours

3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
VSL - using average hours

Number of Person-Years
Ever Change Industry-Occupation
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
VSL - using average hours

3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
VSL - using average hours

Number of Person-Years

First-Difference
Estimator for 2001
minus 1993

0.1234
(1.4164)

0.3097
(3.0008)

0.6
[0.2, 0.9]
0.7
[0.2, 1.1]

1.6
[-0.2, 3.4]
1.8
[-0.3, 3.9]

-0.8074
(3.4029)

0.5758
(5.0319)

-3.8
[-4.7, -3.0]
-4.4
[-5.4, -3.4]

3.0
[0.0, 6.0]
3.4
[0.0, 6.9]

1303 / 1390

282 / 296

1.6405
(0.5088)

1.9125
(1.7859)

6.8
[6.7, 7.0]
7.8
[7.6, 8.0]

8.6
[7.9, 9.3]
9.6
[8.8, 10.4]

1.9845
(0.5776)

1.8399
(1.5713)

8.3
[8.1, 8.5]
9.4
[9.2, 9.7]

8.4
[7.8, 9.0]
9.4
[8.7, 10.1]

3035

735 / 868

Notes: Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for
a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race,
one-digit occupation, state, and year effects. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the
coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000. 95% Confidence Intervals are constructed based
st
on a 1 order Taylor series expansion.

Table 4 cont: Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff by Job Change Status
Only When Change Industry-Occupation
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
VSL - using average hours

3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
VSL - using average hours

Static FirstDifference

First-Difference Estimator for
2001 minus 1993

1.6607
(0.5471)

1.7111
(1.8036)

6.9
[6.7, 7.1]
7.8
[7.6, 8.1]

7.4
[6.7, 8.1]
8.2
[7.4, 9.0]

1.9156
(0.5660)

1.6764
(1.5877)

8.2
[7.9, 8.4]
9.3
[9.0, 9.5]

7.4
[6.7, 8.0]
8.2
[7.5, 8.9]

Number of Person-Years
1920 / 2261
597 / 699
Notes: Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for a
quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race, onedigit occupation, state, and year effects. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients
st
in the table are divided by 1,000. 95% Confidence Intervals are constructed based on a 1 order
Taylor series expansion.

Table 5: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff

Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
95% CI
VSL - using average hours
95% CI

First-Difference IV
Estimator, t−1 and t−3
Fatality as Instruments

First-Difference IV
Estimator, Lag Differenced
Fatality as Instrument

1.5574
(0.6412)

1.5926
(0.6429)

6.7
[6.6, 6.9]
7.7
[7.5, 7.9]

6.9
[6.7, 7.0]
7.9
[7.7, 8.0]

First Stage Results
t−1 fatality rate

0.7752
(0.0118)

t−3 fatality rate

-0.7553
(0.0118)

(t−1 rate) − (t−3 rate)

2

0.7653
(0.0108)

R
0.63
0.63
2
Partial R
0.54
0.54
Robust Wald {p-value}
106 {0.00}
163 {0.00}
Number of Person-Years
4338
4338
Notes: Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls
for a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status,
race, one-digit occupation, state, and year effects. First stage regressions include all
exogenous explanatory variables in addition to the noted instruments. To construct the VSL
using equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000. 95% Confidence
st
Intervals are constructed based on a 1 order Taylor series expansion.

Table 6: Dynamic First Difference Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff
Dynamic First-Difference Estimates
with lag differenced wage instrumented

Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
95% CI
VSL - using average hours
95% CI
2

First Stage Partial R
Robust Wald {p-value}
Number of Person-Years
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
95% CI
VSL - using average hours
95% CI
2

Short-Run Effect

Long-Run Effect

1.6023
(0.5346)

1.9546
[0.039]

7.2
[7.1, 7.4]
8.3
[8.1, 8.6]

8.8
[8.6, 9.1]
10.2
[9.9, 10.4]

0.15
230,100 {0.00}
2788
1.7427
(0.6175)

2.2164
[0.062]

8.0
[7.8, 8.2]
9.2
[9.0, 9.5]

10.2
[10.0, 10.5]
11.7
[11.4, 12.0]

First Stage Partial R
0.15
Robust Wald {p-value}
75,527 {0.00}
Number of Person-Years
3162
Notes: Standard errors are recorded in parentheses and p-values of the null hypothesis that
the long-run effect is zero are recorded in square brackets. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for
a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race,
one-digit occupation, state, and year effects. One and two period lags of the independent
variables, except for the fatality rates, are included as instruments for the lag wage. To
construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000. 95%
st
Confidence Intervals are constructed based on a 1 order Taylor series expansion.

Table 7: Cross Section and Panel Data Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff

Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
95% CI
VSL - using average hours
95% CI
Number of Person-Years
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
95% CI
VSL - using average hours
95% CI
Breusch-Pagan Test for
Random Effects {p-value}
Hausman Test for Fixed –vs.Random Effects {p-value}

Pooled Cross
Section Time
Series
Estimator

BetweenGroup
Estimator

RandomEffects
Estimator

Fixed-Effects
Estimator

4.625
(1.2082)

5.9552
(1.5108)

2.6043
(0.5950)

1.7979
(0.6339)

19.1
[18.8, 19.4]
21.5
[21.1, 21.8]

24.5
[24.1, 25.0]
27.6
[27.2, 28.1]

10.7
[10.6, 10.9]
12.1
[11.9, 12.3]

7.4
[7.3, 7.5]
8.4
[8.2, 8.5]

6625

2036

6625

6468

3.7666
(1.2696)

4.4039
(1.6207)

2.087
(0.7003)

1.4516
(0.7566)

16.2
[15.9, 16.5]
18.4
[18.0, 18.8]

18.9
[18.6, 19.3]
21.5
[21.1, 21.9]

9.0
[8.8, 9.1]
10.2
[10.0, 10.4]

6.2
[6.1, 6.4]
7.1
[6.9, 7.3]

2807
{0.00}
454
{0.00}

Number of Person-Years
5866
2012
5866
5728
Notes: Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors for the pooled times series
cross-section estimator and the first difference estimator are robust to heteroskedasticity and within
industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for a quadratic in age, years of
schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race, one-digit occupation, state, and
year effects. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by
st
1,000. 95% Confidence Intervals are constructed based on a 1 order Taylor series expansion.

Table 8: Specification Checks for First-Difference Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk
Tradeoff
First Difference
Estimates using
Lagged Fatality
Rates

First-Difference
Estimates with
Industry
Dummies

First-Difference
Estimates with
Untrimmed
Fatality Rates

First-Difference
Estimates Using
Alternative Trim
Horizon

Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

1.1611
(0.5356)

1.3455
(0.5136)

1.4281
(0.4253)

1.4988
(0.4332)

Implied VSL ($Millions)
95% CI
VSL - using average hours
95% CI

5.1
[4.9, 5.2]
5.8
[5.7, 5.9]

5.8
[5.7, 5.9]
6.6
[6.5, 6.8]

6.3
[6.2, 6.4]
7.2
[7.1, 7.4]

6.6
[6.5, 6.7]
7.5
[7.4, 7.7]

4406

4338

5242

4916

3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000

0.7777
(0.5553)

1.4107
(0.6050)

1.7186
(0.5366)

1.9304
(0.5729)

Implied VSL ($Millions)
95% CI
VSL - using average hours
95% CI

3.5
[3.4, 3.6]
4.0
[3.9, 4.2]

6.2
[6.1, 6.3]
7.1
[6.9, 7.3]

7.6
[7.5, 7.7]
8.7
[8.5, 8.9]

8.3
[8.2, 8.5]
9.5
[9.3, 9.7]

Number of Person-Years

Number of Person-Years
3695
4916
5242
4338
Notes: Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation Each model controls for a quadratic in age, years of
schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race, one-digit occupation, state, and year
effects. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000. 95%
st
Confidence Intervals are constructed based on a 1 order Taylor series expansion. For the alternative
trim horizon person-years are dropped from the annual fatality rate equation if the three-year average
fatality rate exceeds positive 300 percent or negative 75 percent; likewise person-years are dropped
from the three-year average fatality rate equation if the annual fatality rate exceeds positive 300 percent
or negative 75 percent.

Table 9: Specification Checks for Instrumental Variables Estimates of Wage-Fatal
Risk Tradeoff

Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
95% CI
VSL - using average hours
95% CI

First-Difference
IV Estimator, t−2
and t−3 Fatality
as Instruments

First-Difference
IV Estimator,
Lag Differenced
Fatality as
Instrument

First-Difference
IV Estimator,
t−2 and t−4
Fatality as
Instruments

First-Difference IV
Estimator, Lag
Differenced
Fatality as
Instrument

2.0237
(0.7849)

2.019
(0.7845)

1.6134
(0.7498)

1.589
(0.7496)

8.7
[8.6, 8.9]
10.0
[9.8, 10.2]

8.7
[8.5, 8.9]
10.0
[9.7, 10.2]

7.1
[6.9, 7.3]
8.2
[8.0, 8.4]

7.0
[6.8, 7.2]
8.1
[7.8, 8.3]

First Stage Results
t−2 fatality rate

0.6994
(0.0134)

t−3 fatality rate

-0.7019
(0.0132)

(t−2 rate) − (t−3 rate)

0.7008
(0.0122)

t−2 fatality rate

0.6476
(0.0155)

t−4 fatality rate

-0.6570
(0.0141)

(t−2 rate) − (t−4 rate)

R

2

0.6537
(0.0135)
0.54

0.54

0.55

0.55

Number of Person-Years
4338
4338
3235
3235
Notes: Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for a quadratic in age, years of
schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race, one-digit occupation, state, and year
effects. First stage regressions include all exogenous explanatory variables in addition to the noted
instruments. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000. 95%
st
Confidence Intervals are constructed based on a 1 order Taylor series expansion.

Table 10: Arellano-Bond Dynamic First Difference Estimates of WageFatal Risk Tradeoff
Dynamic First-Difference Estimates
with lag differenced wage instrumented

Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
95% CI
VSL - using average hours
95% CI

Short-Run Effect

Long-Run Effect

1.9094
(0.9150)

2.2893
[0.039]

8.6
[8.4, 8.9]
9.9
[9.7, 10.3]

10.4
[10.1, 10.7]
11.9
[11.5, 12.3]

Number of Person-Years
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
95% CI
VSL – using average hours
95% CI

2788
1.7056
(0.9050)

2.1563
[0.062]

7.9
[7.6, 8.1]
9
[8.8, 9.3]

9.9
[9.7, 10.2]
11.4
[11.1, 11.7]

Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions
Test-Annual Fatality {p-value}

79.78
{0.16}

Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions
Test-3-Year Fatality {p-value}

88.96
{0.05}

Number of Observations
3162
Notes: Standard errors are recorded in parentheses and p-values of the null hypothesis that
the long-run effect is zero are recorded in square brackets. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls
for a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status,
race, one-digit occupation, state, and year effects. One and two year lags of the independent
variables, except for the fatality rates, are included as instruments for the lag wage. To
construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000. 95%
st
Confidence Intervals are constructed based on a 1 order Taylor series expansion.

References
Abowd, J. and D. Card. (1989). “On the Covariance Structure of Earnings and Hours
Changes.” Econometrica 57(2): 411–445.
Aldy, J. E. and W. K. Viscusi. (2008). “Adjusting the Value of a Statistical Life for Age
and Cohort Effects.” Review of Economics and Statistics 90(3): 573–581.
Arellano, M. and S. Bond. (1991). “Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations.” Review of Economic
Studies 58: 277–297.
Ashenfelter, O. (2006). “Measuring the Value of a Statistical Life: Problems and
Prospects.” Economic Journal 116(510): C10–C23.
Ashenfelter, O. and M. Greenstone. (2004a). “Using Mandated Speed Limits to Measure
the Value of a Statistical Life.” Journal of Political Economy 112(1, pt. 2): S226–
S267.
Ashenfelter, O. and M. Greenstone. (2004b). “Estimating the Value of a Statistical Life:
The Importance of Omitted Variables and Publication Bias.” American Economic
Association Papers and Proceedings 94(2): 454–460.
Bilmes, L. and J. Stiglitz. (2006). “The Economic Costs of the Iraq War: An Appraisal
Three Years After the Beginning of the Conflict.” National Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Paper 12054.
Black, D.A. and T.J. Kniesner. (2003). “On the Measurement of Job Risk in Hedonic
Wage Models.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 27(3): 205–220.
Breyer, Stephen. (1993). Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Brown, C. (1980). “Equalizing Differences in the Labor Market.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 94(1): 113–134.
Ekeland, I., J.J. Heckman, and L. Nesheim. (2004). “Identification and Estimation of
Hedonic Models.” Journal of Political Economy 112(1, pt. 2): S60–S109.
Greene, W.H. (2008). Econometric Analysis, Sixth Edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ
Pearson Prentice Hall.
Griliches, Z. and J.A. Hausman. (1986). “Errors in Variables in Panel Data.” Journal of
Econometrics 31(1): 93–118.

Hahn, J., J. Hausman, and G. Kuersteiner. (2007). “Long Difference Instrumental
Variables Estimation for Dynamic Panel Models with Fixed Effects.” Journal of
Econometrics 140(2): 574–617.
Hwang, H., W.R. Reed, and C. Hubbard. (1992). “Compensating Wage Differentials and
Unobserved Productivity.” Journal of Political Economy 100(4): 835–858.
Jena, A., C. Mulligan, T. J. Philipson, and E. Sun. (2008). “The Value of Life in General
Equilibrium.” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 14157.
Keane, M.P. (1993). “Individual Heterogeneity and Interindustry Wage Differentials.”
Journal of Human Resources 28(1): 134–161.
Kniesner, T.J. and J.D. Leeth. (2004). “Data Mining Mining Data: MSHA Enforcement
Efforts, Underground Coal Mine Safety, and New Health Policy Implications.”
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 29(2): 83–111.
Kniesner, T.J., W.K. Viscusi, and J.P. Ziliak. (2006). “Life-Cycle Consumption and the
Age-Adjusted Value of Life.” Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy 5(1):
Article 4, http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol5/iss1/art4.
Lang, K. and S. Majumdar. (2004). “The Pricing of Job Characteristics When Markets
Do Not Clear: Theory and Policy Implications.” International Economic Review
45(4): 1111–1128.
Lillard, L. and Y. Weiss. (1979). “Components of Variation in Panel Earnings Data:
American Scientists.” Econometrica 47(2): 437–454.
MaCurdy, T. (2007). “A Practitioner’s Approach to Estimating Intertemporal
Relationships Using Longitudinal Data: Lessons from Applications in Wage
Dynamics.” In J. Heckman and E. Leamer (eds.), Handbook of Econometrics,
Volume 6A. Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V., Chapter 62, pp. 4057–4167.
Mellow, W., and H. Sider. (1983). “Accuracy of Responses in Labor Market Surveys:
Evidence and Implication.” Journal of Labor Economics 1(4): 331–344.
Shogren, J.F. and T. Stamland. (2002). “Skill and the Value of Life.” Journal of Political
Economy 110(5): 1168–1173.
Solon, G. (1986). “Bias in Longitudinal Estimation of Wage Gaps.” National Bureau of
Economic Research, Technical Working Paper 58.
Solon, G. (1989). “The Value of Panel Data in Economic Research.” In D. Kasprzyk, G.
Duncan, G. Kolton, and M.P. Singh (eds.), Panel Surveys. New York: John Wiley
and Sons, pp. 486–496.

Spengler, H. and S. Schaffner. (2006). “Using Job Changes to Evaluate the Bias of the
Value of a Statistical Life.” Unpublished paper, Darmstadt University of Technology,
March.
Thaler, R. and S. Rosen. (1975). “The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence from the Labor
Market.” In N.E. Terleckyj (ed.), Household Production and Consumption. New
York: Columbia University Press, pp. 265–300.
Viscusi, W.K. (1979). Employment Hazards: An Investigation of Market Performance.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Viscusi, W.K. (2004). “The Value of Life: Estimates with Risks by Occupation and
Industry.” Economic Inquiry 42(1): 29–48.
Viscusi, W. K. and J. Aldy. (2003). “The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review
of Market Estimates throughout the World.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 27(1):
5–76.
Viscusi, W.K. and J. Hersch. (2001). “Cigarette Smokers As Job Risk Takers.” Review of
Economics and Statistics 83(2): 269–280.
Wallsten, S. and K. Kosec. (2005). “The Economic Costs of the War in Iraq.” AEIBrookings Joint Center, Working Paper 05-19.
Weiss, Y. and L.A. Lillard. (1978). “Experience, Vintage, and Time Effects in the
Growth of Earnings: American Scientists, 1960–1970.” Journal of Political Economy
86(3): 427–447.
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross-Section and Panel Data.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Ziliak, J.P. and T.J. Kniesner. (1998). “The Importance of Sample Attrition in Life-Cycle
Labor Supply Estimation.” Journal of Human Resources 33(2): 507–530.

